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Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200080002-8

Washington, D. C.
23 October 1957

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

This letter will confirm our conversation of 22 October during which we stated to you that we believed the United States is in a period of national emergency.

We spent the day preceding our conversation with you in reviewing and discussing evidence regarding the Soviet guided missile program, particularly those aspects dealing with offensive ballistic missiles. The data proves beyond question that the Russians have an orderly and progressive program which is being prosecuted in an aggressive and intelligent manner. The program does not appear to us to be of a "crash" nature but rather one that has been thoroughly thought out and followed for years. One of the most disturbing features revealed is the high level of Soviet competence in achieving their planned goals. Just two points will illustrate this conclusion:

a. Soviet test range operations show an unusually high reliability in launchings. Only a very small percentage of operations planned do not culminate at the scheduled time. In this context, it should be noted that both the first firing to 950 nautical miles and the orbiting of their satellite were accomplished as scheduled and with practically no delays.

b. The accuracies achieved in their firings to 650 nautical miles indicate an extremely high proficiency in guidance components such that no imagination is required to extrapolate these results to usable accuracies in an ICBM.

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As mentioned above, the progression in their ballistic missile program to include ranges of 75, 150, 300, 650, 950 nautical miles, an ICBM, and earth satellite, illustrates thoroughly the soundest technical concept and execution. This program is likewise supported by highly reliable rocket motors with thrusts up to 100 metric tons. This latter motor, reportedly ready for static tests in 1952, is about fifty percent more powerful than the largest American motor, and probably is an essential element of the Soviet ICBM. Inasmuch as precise guidance and dependable propulsion are the chief factors in an ICBM, we must conclude that the USSR can have some (a dozen) operational missiles by the end of 1958. We must also conclude that significant quantities of these missiles (with atomic warheads) are not large quantities and could be produced fairly rapidly.

Our high concern has resulted from our knowledge of the US program (acquired from our official military connections) and our comparison of the US and USSR programs. Although we realize intelligence has no responsibility for making comparisons of this nature, omission would remove basis for concern. US experience in ballistic missiles does not match that of the USSR and in our opinion is lagging by two to three years. We submit that there is no spot remedy that will eliminate this critical difference in capabilities within any short time period. Rather, only by the most determined and concentrated US effort, extending over a period of several years, will we raise our experience level again to a par with the USSR.

Not immediately akin but very closely connected, it is our belief that guided missile intelligence must be more closely interwoven both within itself and with the US research and development program such that intelligence may be able to arrive at firmer conclusions on a greatly accelerated time base. Inasmuch as national policy decisions are being made in Washington, intelligence, to be timely, also needs to be accomplished in Washington. For this reason, we submit that the technical competence of CIA should be expanded without delay and that direct connections between CIA and US missile contractors be effected.

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We note that the guided missile intelligence community has initiated some technical studies which might lead to a refinement in the military characteristics of an ICBM. While refinement of estimates is required, such should not obscure nor delay the basic fact of the near existence of a Soviet operational ICBM.

Your consultant panel believes, as stated before, that the country is in a period of grave national emergency and that it will only be by the most intelligent and coordinated efforts of all concerned over a period of some years before such an emergency can be eliminated. In parallel, we cannot emphasize too much that increased efforts by the intelligence community, both overt and covert, are mandatory to counter this threat.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

General Cabell

Bob Amory recommended to the Director that copies of the attached be shown to [redacted] "at least" and possibly to the President and to the Secretary of Defense.

The Director has approved dissemination to Secretaries of State and Defense and Andy Goodpaster for the President. We will also send along a memo of transmittal giving a brief note about the authors of the report and why it was prepared.

28 Oct 57
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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